Britain's defence: what we spend, where it goes and what it buys
🛡️ Britain's defence: what we spend, where it goes, and why snapshotMoD, Parliament, NATO, SIPRI, MI5 & Home Office figures · reviewed 23 Sep 2026
Britain spent £62bn on defence in 2025-26 — about £1,520 for each of Britain's 40.8 million income tax payers (HMRC's projection for 2026-27; who they are) — and plans £68.3bn this year and £79.1bn by 2029-30. Put another way, about 5p of every pound the government raised in 2025-26 (£1,231bn of public sector current receipts, ONS first estimate, Mar 2026). On NATO's wider definition it is 2.4% of national income in 2025 — 6.3% of government revenue — heading for 2.6% of GDP (6.5% of revenue) in 2026: the sixth-largest military budget in the world, a third of the share of GDP Britain spent in 1960, and still short of the 3.5% it has promised NATO by 2035. The rest of this tile is where that money goes, where the forces are and why, and the threats the government says it is buying against.
Defence spending since 1960, as a share of the economy
1960
7.1%
1965
6.4%
1970
5.2%
1975
5.3%
1980
5.0%
1984
5.5%the 1980s peak
1990
4.0%· 11.9% of revenuethe Cold War ends
1995
2.9%· 8.8% of revenue
2000
2.4%· 6.7% of revenue
2005
2.4%· 6.9% of revenue
2010
2.6%· 7.3% of revenue
2015
2.0%· 5.8% of revenue
2018
1.9%· 5.4% of revenuethe lowest since 1960
2020
2.2%· 5.9% of revenue
2022
2.1%· 5.3% of revenue
2024
2.3%· 6.1% of revenue
Share of GDP, calendar years (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, via the World Bank (MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS), Jul 2026); share of government revenue from 1990, the first year of the IMF's series (IMF Fiscal Monitor, Apr 2026 (general government revenue); our division of one share by the other). In 1990 defence took about one pound in eight the state raised; in 2024 about one in sixteen. The line fell for sixty years: the end of empire, then the end of the Cold War — the “peace dividend” — then the austerity years, when MoD spending fell 22% in real terms between 2009-10 and 2016-17. It has turned upward since 2018. NATO's own measure counts a little more (pensions, some intelligence) and gives 2.33% for 2024.
The promises, and where they have got to
25 Feb 20252.5% of GDP by 2027Brought forward by the Prime Minister — “an increase of £13.4bn year on year compared to where we are today” — and 2.6% counting the intelligence agencies.2.5% of GDP ≈ 6.1% of government revenue
24-25 Jun 2025NATO's 5% by 2035The Hague summit: at least 3.5% of GDP on core defence plus up to 1.5% on resilience. The UK signed up.3.5% of GDP ≈ 8.3% of government revenue
30 Jun 2026Defence Investment Plan£298bn over four years, including £15bn of additional funding (£11.6bn of it new cash); 2.7% of GDP in 2027-28, the highest share since the 1990s.2.7% of GDP ≈ 6.6% of government revenue
Next Parliament3% of GDPAn ambition, not a date. The Plan says funding will be set out at the next Spending Review, “where defence will be the number one priority”.3% of GDP ≈ 7.2% of government revenue
By 20353.5% core defenceThe NATO commitment. Nothing yet sets out year by year how the UK gets from 2.7% to 3.5%.3.5% of GDP ≈ 8.3% of government revenue
Green has happened; amber is still a promise. The revenue equivalents use the IMF's forecast of UK revenue for 2027, 2029, 2031 (it forecasts no further than 2031, so 2035 uses 2031) — our arithmetic. John Healey resigned as Defence Secretary on 11 Jun 2026, saying the funding settlement “falls well short of what is required”; Dan Jarvis succeeded him.
Where the next four years' money goes
People and veterans
£78.5bn£1,924 per taxpayer
The nuclear enterprise
£63.6bn£1,559 per taxpayer
Air
£27.8bn£681 per taxpayer
Buildings and bases
£22.7bn£556 per taxpayer
Land
£19.2bn£471 per taxpayer
Maritime
£18bn£441 per taxpayer
Munitions and weapons
£11.1bn£272 per taxpayer
£298bn over 2026-27 to 2029-30 (The Defence Investment Plan, MoD, 30 Jun 2026; Commons Library CBP-10935). The seven headings the Plan names add up to £240.9bn (our arithmetic); the rest is not broken down in them. "Per taxpayer" means each of Britain's 40.8 million income tax payers, and is for all four years, not one. For one year, 2024-25, MoD Departmental Resources (Jan 2026): £15.8bn on service and civilian pay, £27.4bn on equipment, £3.1bn on research and £3.4bn on operations — defence was 6.7% of all government spending. Will it be enough? The last ten-year plan the National Audit Office examined was £16.9bn short: £305.5bn of costs against £288.6bn of budget (Equipment Plan 2023-33, NAO, Dec 2023). The NAO's first verdict on the new Plan is due in autumn 2026.
Part of the rise is paid for by aid. Overseas aid falls from 0.5% to 0.3% of national income by 2027-28 — about £9.2bn a year instead of £15.4bn, the lowest share of national income since 1999. That frees £0.5bn in 2025-26, £4.8bn in 2026-27, £6.5bn in 2027-28 for defence (Commons Library CBP-10243, Sep 2026). What that means for the charities and agencies working abroad is further down.
How Britain compares
United States
$954bn3.1% of GDP · 10.0% of revenue
China *
$336bn1.7% of GDP · 6.8% of revenue
Russia *
$190bn7.5% of GDP · 21.3% of revenue
Germany
$114bn2.3% of GDP · 4.8% of revenue
India
$92.1bn2.3% of GDP · 10.9% of revenue
United Kingdom
$89bn2.4% of GDP · 6.3% of revenue
Ukraine
$84.1bn40.0% of GDP · 78.1% of revenue
France
$68bn2.0% of GDP · 3.8% of revenue
Poland
$46.8bn4.5% of GDP · 10.5% of revenue
2025, US dollars, a selection from SIPRI's top fifteen (SIPRI Fact Sheet, Apr 2026 (world total $2,887bn; Russian and Chinese figures are SIPRI estimates)). * estimated. Share of revenue is our division of each country's defence share of GDP by its government revenue share of GDP (IMF Fiscal Monitor, Apr 2026 (general government revenue)). Britain is 6th by cash. Measured against what each state raises, the picture changes: Russia spends about 21.3% of its revenue on the military (SIPRI puts it at a fifth of all government spending, the highest share it has recorded for Russia), India and the US about a tenth, Britain 6.3%, and France and Germany under 5% — they tax more, so the same share of GDP is a smaller share of the budget. Ukraine, at war, spends 78.1% of its revenue, the gap covered by foreign aid and borrowing. Among NATO members for 2026 the UK is 3rd by cash and 14th by share of GDP.
The people.127,060 full-time trained personnel — 70,950 Army, 28,260 Royal Navy and Royal Marines, 27,850 RAF — and 182,980 counting reserves, trainees, Gurkhas and others (1 Jul 2026, MoD, Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics (3 Sep 2026)). The regular forces alone number 137,480 plus 4,420 Gurkhas; in 1990 they were 305,700 and in 2000 207,600 (Commons Library RP00/99 (UK regular forces)). The floor for the Army was set by the Strategic Defence Review (Jun 2025): “a minimum of 100,000 soldiers, of which 73,000 are regular”; the government's aim is “at least 76,000 full-time soldiers in the next Parliament”. For the first time since early 2022 more people are joining than leaving — 14,500 in and 13,050 out in the year to June. Pay rose 3.6% this year (2026-27 award, MoD 9 Jun 2026); the average is £45,710. The MoD also employs 55,351 civil servants (FTE, 1 Apr 2026).
The MoD publishes four different headcounts — all personnel, regulars and Gurkhas, full-time trained, and the Commons Library's “full-time” — and they differ by tens of thousands. Each figure here says which it is.
What the forces have
Aircraft carriers
2
HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales
Submarines
9
4 Vanguard-class carrying Trident; 5 Astute-class attack boats in service (a sixth, Agamemnon, commissioned Sep 2025 and on trials)
Royal Navy surface ships
52
plus 12 Royal Fleet Auxiliary; five Type 23 frigates remain in service; the retirement of HMS Richmond and HMS Iron Duke was announced on 13 Jul 2026
Typhoon fighters
124
the most numerous aircraft type
F-35B stealth jets
47
48 delivered, one lost; 138 still the stated lifetime aim, next batch of 27 (15 F-35B, 12 F-35A) from the early 2030s
Aircraft in all
945
507 fixed-wing, 249 helicopters, 189 uncrewed; Reaper retired Oct 2025, replaced by Protector
Land combat vehicles
4,033
including 723 Bulldog, 651 Jackal, 526 Warrior; 148 Challenger 3 tanks due to enter service from 2027
Counts at 1 Apr 2026 unless stated (MoD, UK armed forces equipment and formations 2026 (20 Aug 2026); Royal Navy; Parliament written answers).
What things cost
Dreadnought submarines (4, replacing Vanguard)
£31bn–£41bn£7.75bn–£10bn a boat · £31bn plus a £10bn contingency, Commons Library CBP-8166 (Jul 2026)
Astute submarines (7)
£11.3bnabout £1.6bn a boat · whole-life programme cost, Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 2023-24
Type 26 frigates (8)
£7.9bnabout £1bn a ship · £3.7bn for three (2017) + £4.2bn for five (2022), contract values
Queen Elizabeth carriers (2)
£6.21bnabout £3.1bn each · approved cost, NAO, Mar 2017
Ajax armoured vehicles (589)
£6.2bnabout £10.5m each · Commons Library, 2026 — contract £5.5bn; trials paused Nov–Dec 2025, resumed from Apr 2026
Type 31 frigates (5)
£1.25bnabout £250m a ship · contract, Nov 2019
RCH 155 guns (72)
£1.0bnabout £13.9m each · “just shy of £1 billion”, May 2026
Challenger 3 tanks (148)
£800mabout £5.4m each · upgrade programme, 2026
One F-35B
$101mflyaway, before support · Lot 14 unit cost, written answer 93484 (Nov 2022)
Programme and contract figures in the money of the year given, so they are not strictly comparable with each other; “each” is our division of the total by the number bought. Why Dreadnought and not Vanguard? The four Vanguards were paid for in the 1980s and 1990s and will be retired as their replacements arrive; Dreadnought is the money being spent now, on the boats that replace them from the early 2030s, so it is the cost that is still a decision. The MoD does not publish what a missile or a shell costs — a minister told the Lords in Feb 2024 that it is “information which we do not divulge”, and the price of the latest Storm Shadow order was withheld. Figures you will see elsewhere for those are media estimates, and are not printed here.
Trident: the deterrent. Since 1969 one of Britain's 4 Vanguard submarines has been at sea at all times, somewhere nobody knows, carrying Trident missiles — continuous at-sea deterrence. The stockpile is capped at 260 warheads. The Vanguards are being replaced by four Dreadnoughts in the early 2030s, and the warhead by Astraea (A21), in development at AWE, replacing the current warhead from the late 2030s. The whole nuclear enterprise cost £12bn in 2025-26 — about 19% of the defence budget (our division), about £294 per payer — and gets £63.6bn over the next four years (MoD, Defence Nuclear Enterprise annual update, 15 Sep 2026: “spent £12bn in the financial year 2025/26”). On 25 Jun 2025 the UK said it would buy 12 F-35A jets to join NATO's air-delivered nuclear mission.
The UK is “deliberately ambiguous” about when it would use nuclear weapons: only “in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies”. It has never ruled out using them first. (Integrated Review 2021, still the stated policy). “There is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by our two nations” — the Northwood Declaration with France, 10 Jul 2025, which says the two forces “are independent, but can be coordinated”. The logic is that of the game below at its extreme: the weapon exists so that it is never used, and it works only if an enemy cannot be sure it would not be.
Where the forces are, and why there
⚓ Guarding the sea lanes
Gibraltar — Naval base, RAF airfield, patrol squadron. Why: the gateway between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.
Bahrain (HMS Jufair) — Naval support facility and the UK Maritime Component Command, about 125 staff (Dec 2025). Why: the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf — the first permanent Royal Navy base east of Suez in nearly 50 years (2018).
Oman (Duqm) — Joint Logistics Support Base with a dry dock; a training range. Why: east of Suez but outside the Gulf — reach into the Arabian Sea and towards Bab-el-Mandeb.
Singapore (Sembawang) — Wharf and fuel depot. Why: the Malacca Strait, one of the world's busiest shipping lanes.
Indo-Pacific — HMS Spey and HMS Tamar, on station five years in Sep 2026. Why: sanctions patrols on North Korea, exercises and disaster relief.
✈️ Staging posts and air bridges
Cyprus (Akrotiri and Dhekelia) — RAF Akrotiri — the main base for combat jets flying into the Middle East — and two infantry battalions. Why: the launch pad for the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East; hit by a drone on the night of 1–2 Mar 2026.
Ascension Island — RAF airfield. Why: halfway between Britain and the Falklands, about 4,000 miles from each.
Diego Garcia — Joint UK/US base, mainly American. Why: reach across the Indian Ocean; the treaty handing sovereignty to Mauritius (May 2025) has not been ratified — see the Chagos tile.
Qatar (Al Udeid) — RAF 83 Expeditionary Air Group; a joint UK–Qatar Typhoon squadron. Why: air operations across the Gulf.
🛡️ Reassuring allies on NATO's edge
Estonia (Tapa) — About 800 troops in rotation, a brigade held ready in the UK; rising to about 1,200 from Apr 2027 (agreement of 16 Jul 2026). Why: a tripwire: an attack on Estonia would meet British soldiers on the first day.
Poland — A reconnaissance squadron. Why: NATO's eastern flank.
Norway (Camp Viking) — Royal Marines' Arctic hub; about 1,500 deploy in 2026. Why: the High North, home waters of Russia's Northern Fleet.
Germany (Sennelager) — NATO forward holding base for tanks and equipment; 570 personnel (2025). Why: kit pre-positioned where it would be needed.
🌍 Training space Britain does not have
Kenya (BATUK) — The Army's largest presence in Africa; up to 1,700 on exercises. Why: hot, open ground; the Sep 2026 exercise was cancelled in a dispute over the defence agreement.
Canada (BATUS) — 2,700 sq km, the Army's largest training area. Why: room to manoeuvre armoured brigades with live fire.
Belize and Brunei — Jungle training; a Gurkha battalion in Brunei. Why: jungle, and a foothold in the Indo-Pacific.
🏝️ Defending British territory
Falklands (Mount Pleasant) — Typhoons, a tanker, a patrol ship, an infantry company — over 1,000 people (2021 figure). Why: to deter another invasion — see the Falklands tile.
5,570 regular personnel are stationed overseas (regular forces stationed overseas, 1 Apr 2026 — not counting those deployed on operations): 66% Europe, 13% North America, 6% North Africa and the Middle East, 5% Asia, 5% sub-Saharan Africa. Per-country counts are published only in a spreadsheet we have not yet read, so most bases above carry no headcount, and the Falklands figure is from 2021. The pattern is the answer to “why there?”: the narrow seas the world's trade passes through, the places a plane has to stop on the way, the allies nearest Russia, the land Britain has not got to train on, and the territories it has promised to defend. (Commons Library CBP-8794 (Aug 2026) and CBP-7930; MoD location statistics (1 Apr 2026); British Army, Royal Navy and RAF.)
The strategy behind it
Mar 2023Integrated Review RefreshThe “tilt” to the Indo-Pacific made “a permanent pillar” of foreign policy.
2 Jun 2025Strategic Defence Review“NATO First” is the Review's “starting point” — but “does not mean NATO only”, because the Overseas Territories need Britain's own forces. Russia is “an immediate and pressing threat”, China “a sophisticated and persistent challenge”, Iran and North Korea “regional disruptors”.
24 Jun 2025National Security Strategy5% of GDP on national security by 2035; a return to 0.7% on aid “when fiscal circumstances allow”.
30 Jun 2026Defence Investment PlanThe money behind the Review: £298bn over four years.
If they do this, we do this
Four states the government names in its own strategy, what it says each does, and what Britain has done in return.
🇷🇺Russia“an immediate and pressing threat” (SDR 2025)
What the UK says they do
The war in Ukraine; in Britain, what the NSS calls “assassination, intimidation, espionage, sabotage, cyber attacks”
A Wagner-directed arson attack in Leyton (Mar 2024) — the first convictions under the National Security Act 2023
A “shadow fleet” of tankers moving oil round sanctions; threats to undersea cables; drones into Polish airspace (Sep 2025)
What the UK has done
£16bn of military aid to Ukraine since 2022 and at least £3bn a year to 2030-31
3,450 sanctions designations (Aug 2026), including over 600 ships; £28.7bn of assets frozen (May 2025)
Typhoons to NATO's Eastern Sentry; Nordic Warden watching the cables; the first shadow-fleet tanker seized in the Channel, 14 Jun 2026
The game (our reading): Deterrence by denial: make aggression fail. Ukraine's defence and troops in Estonia raise the cost of the next step, and each sabotage answered with prosecutions or seizures tells Moscow the grey zone is not free.
🇨🇳China“a sophisticated and persistent challenge” (SDR 2025)
Approaches to parliamentarians through LinkedIn (MI5 alert, Nov 2025)
Economic, military and technological modernisation “on a scale that is unprecedented in world history” (NSS 2025)
What the UK has done
AUKUS with the US and Australia — up to 12 new attack submarines
A carrier strike group sailed to the Indo-Pacific in 2025 with ten partner nations
Engagement alongside it: the Prime Minister visited Beijing in Jan 2026 and the new Chinese embassy was approved
The game (our reading): A mixed game, not a zero-sum one. China is also a trading partner, so the UK pairs presence in the Indo-Pacific with trade and dialogue. Critics call that inconsistent; the government calls it managing both at once. The collapse of an espionage case in Sep 2025 is where that argument is fiercest.
🇮🇷Irana “regional disruptor” (SDR 2025)
What the UK says they do
MI5: “more than twenty potentially lethal Iran-backed plots” in Britain in the year to Oct 2025
Backing the Houthis, who attacked Red Sea shipping from 2023
In the 2026 war, attacks on the bases Britain uses in Bahrain, Qatar and Cyprus — an Iranian-made drone struck RAF Akrotiri on the night of 1–2 Mar 2026 (whether Iran or Hezbollah launched it is disputed), and missiles were fired at Diego Garcia on 21 Mar
What the UK has done
Strikes on Houthi targets with the US from Jan 2024
In 2026 the UK did not join the US–Israeli strikes; it intercepted drones and missiles over Qatar, Jordan, Iraq and Cyprus and let the US use Diego Garcia and Fairford for “a specific and limited defensive purpose”. A ceasefire came on 8 Apr 2026
The IRGC was designated on 17 Jul 2026 under the new National Security (State Threats) Act — the state-backed equivalent of proscription
The game (our reading): Escalation control. Britain answered attacks on shipping and its own bases, but kept out of the offensive, to stay below the rung where it becomes a party to the war.
🇰🇵North Koreaa “regional disruptor” (SDR 2025)
What the UK says they do
Sent “thousands of troops to support Russia's illegal war in Ukraine” (NSS 2025)
Nuclear and missile tests in breach of UN resolutions
What the UK has done
HMS Spey and HMS Tamar patrol to enforce UN sanctions at sea
The game (our reading): Collective pressure: the UK's part is enforcement at sea and at the UN, not a front line.
The rules of the game.
Punishment. “The aggressor must believe they will incur a specific punishment in the case of a transgression.” MCDC, deterrence note hosted by the MoD (2019)
Denial. “The adversary may refrain from taking aggressive action if they regard their chances of success to be lower as a result of mitigating or preparatory measures taken by the actor targeted.” same
The grey zone. Hostile activity in the so-called grey zone between war and peace, designed to stay below the line that would trigger NATO's Article 5. same; RUSI, Aug 2025
Credible commitment. Article 5 of the NATO treaty: an attack on one is an attack on all. It works only if every ally believes the others would act — which is why about 800 British troops in Estonia matter more than their number. NATO treaty; the tripwire reading is ours
Game theory's word for all of this is signalling: each side acts partly to change what the other believes it will do next. The descriptions of each country are the UK government's own words, quoted; they are how Britain sees these states, not a neutral finding, and each government named disputes them.
Terrorism: the threat level, and the groups behind it
LOWan attack is highly unlikely
MODERATEan attack is possible, but not likely
SUBSTANTIALan attack is likely
SEVEREan attack is highly likely
CRITICALan attack is highly likely in the near future
The UK threat level is SEVERE — “an attack is highly likely” — since the end of April 2026: JTAC raised it from SUBSTANTIAL after “the stabbing in Golders Green in North London, but it is not solely a result of that attack”, citing “an increase in the broader Islamist and Extreme Right Wing terrorist threat from individuals and small groups based in the UK” and “increased state-linked physical threats” (GOV.UK, UK national threat level raised to severe, 1 May 2026). In Northern Ireland the separate Northern Ireland-related level is SUBSTANTIAL (since 6 Mar 2024). MI5, Threat levels (set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre). What stands behind it: MI5 has disrupted 19 late-stage attack plots since the start of 2020 (to Oct 2025) (43 since March 2017, by the 2024 count); in Oct 2024 about 75% of its terrorism caseload was Islamist and 25% extreme right-wing, and 13% of those it investigated were under 18; one in five of the 232 terrorism arrests in the latest year were of children under 17 (MI5 Director General, threat updates of 8 Oct 2024 and 16 Oct 2025).
Group (year proscribed)
Where
What it wants, in the Home Office's words
Islamic State (Daesh)
Middle East, with branches in Africa and Asia
“establish an Islamic State governed by Sharia law … using violence and extortion”
Al Qa'ida
Global
“expulsion of Western forces from Saudi Arabia, the destruction of Israel and the end of Western influence in the Muslim world”
Al Shabaab
Somalia and East Africa
fundamentalist Islamic rule in Somalia, aligned with the global jihadist movement
Boko Haram
Nigeria and the Lake Chad region
“establish Islamic law in Nigeria”
Hizballah (whole organisation, 2019)
Lebanon
“armed resistance to the state of Israel” and to “seize all Palestinian territories and Jerusalem from Israel”
Hamas (whole organisation, 2021)
Gaza and the Palestinian territories
“liberate Palestine … establishment of an Islamic state under Sharia law”
Wagner Group (2023)
Russia, operating in Africa and Ukraine
a “malign proxy military force” of the Russian state
Russian Imperial Movement (2025)
Russia
“create a new Russian imperial state”
National Action (2016)
United Kingdom
a “racist neo-Nazi” group whose ideology holds that “Britain will inevitably see a violent ‘race war’”
Terrorgram Collective (2024)
Online, transnational
“collapse of Western democracy and a ‘race war’”
The Base
Transnational (US-founded)
the collapse of society through “race war”
84 organisations are proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000, and 14 Northern Ireland groups under earlier law (Home Office, Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations, updated 7 Jul 2026). Belonging to one, or inviting support for one, is a crime. These eleven are our selection for their relevance to Britain; the aims are the Home Office's descriptions, not the groups' own. Palestine Action was proscribed on 5 Jul 2025; the Home Office describes its aim as “Palestinian sovereignty by using direct criminal action tactics to halt the sale and export of military equipment to Israel”. The High Court ruled the ban unlawful on 13 Feb 2026; the Court of Appeal reversed that on 15 Jun 2026, finding that the ban struck a fair balance between the right to protest and the interests of the community; the Supreme Court gave permission to appeal on 30 Jul 2026, with a hearing expected this autumn. The ban stays in force meanwhile. The IRGC is not a proscribed terrorist organisation. Regulations laid on 13 Jul 2026 designated it from 17 Jul 2026 — with the Iran-backed “Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right” and Russia's “GRU Volunteer Corps” — under the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026, a new power for state-backed groups that the Home Office calls “equivalent to proscription”.
Cyber and the home front. The National Cyber Security Centre handled 429 incidents in Sep 2024 – Aug 2025, of which 204 were nationally significant — up from 89, about four a week — and 18 highly significant (NCSC Annual Review, Oct 2025). The costliest yet assessed hit Jaguar Land Rover in Aug–Sep 2025: £1.9bn — production stopped for about five weeks; a £1.5bn government loan guarantee; the Cyber Monitoring Centre's estimate of the cost to the UK — the most expensive cyber incident it has assessed. The National Cyber Force (2020) — GCHQ, the MoD, MI6 and Dstl together, answering to the Foreign and Defence Secretaries — runs Britain's offensive cyber operations; its headquarters is being built at Samlesbury, Lancashire. The Strategic Defence Review created a Cyber and Electromagnetic Command and put up to £1bn into defending Britain from the air and missiles. A Resilience Action Plan (Jul 2025) and Exercise PEGASUS, the largest pandemic exercise in British history; a public campaign on being prepared is due later in 2026.
Soft power, aid and the NGOs. Not all of Britain's security is bought with weapons. The government's own case, in the Foreign Secretary's words: “crises and instability across the world undermine our security and prosperity at home” (Foreign Secretary, written statement HCWS1425, 19 Mar 2026). So some of the money goes through others: about £1.4bn a year on humanitarian aid, much of it delivered by charities and UN agencies; more than 70% of country spending to fragile and conflict-affected states by 2028-29; an Integrated Security Fund of £855m in 2025-26 for peacekeeping, stabilisation, cyber and serious crime; £19.8m to clear landmines in 12 countries in 2024, through NGOs such as the HALO Trust and the Mines Advisory Group. The BBC World Service, a fifth smaller in real terms than in 2021-22, reaches 313 million people a week, with £137m from the Foreign Office; the British Council has cut 2,110 posts since 2021 and owes the Foreign Office a £197m loan.
What NGOs do abroad is not military work — feeding, treating, clearing mines, rebuilding — but governments count it as security because instability travels. Humanitarian charities stress their independence from governments, which they say helps keep their staff safe; and they opposed the aid cut: “a short-sighted and appalling move” that will “weaken our own national security interests” (Bond, the UK network of development NGOs, 25 Feb 2025).
The case for spending more
The threats are real and growing. A war in Europe now in its fifth year, more than twenty Iran-backed plots in Britain in a year, four nationally significant cyber attacks a week, missiles fired at British bases in 2026, and a terrorism threat level raised to SEVERE in April.
The forces are the smallest in modern times. 137,480 regulars against 305,700 in 1990; five frigates of an ageing class; an armoured vehicle £6.2bn in whose trials were halted for five months after soldiers fell ill.
The plan was already unaffordable. The NAO found a £16.9bn hole before the new commitments; the Defence Secretary resigned saying the settlement “falls well short”.
Allies expect it. Britain has signed up to 3.5% by 2035 and sits 14th in NATO by share of income.
The case for caution
Part of it is paid for by cutting aid. Aid falls to 0.3% of national income; development charities call that “a short-sighted and appalling move” that will “weaken our own national security interests” — their argument is that the instability aid prevents is itself a security risk.
Money is not the only problem. Ajax, years late, shows that how the MoD buys matters as much as how much it spends; the NAO has not yet judged the new Plan.
Almost a fifth goes on the deterrent. 19% of the budget for weapons designed never to be used — the insurance premium, or the price of conventional forces Britain no longer has, depending on who you ask.
Every pound has another use. At about £1,520 per income tax payer a year, each rise is a choice against something else — health, schools, or lower taxes.
iIf you pay income tax, you put about £1,520 towards defence last year, of which about £294 was the nuclear deterrent. That buys a submarine you will never see, about 800 soldiers in Estonia whose job is to be there on the first day, jets over Cyprus and patrol ships in the Pacific. It also buys things you might use: the cyber defences behind your bank and the terrorism threat level on the news. The honest questions are the ones Parliament argues about — whether it is enough, whether it is spent well, and whether cutting aid to pay for it makes Britain safer or just moves the risk. The figures here are to help you answer those for yourself.