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Diego Garcia and the Chagos Islands: the deal and what it costs

🌴 Diego Garcia and the Chagos Islands: the deal that has not happened snapshot Parliament, the ICJ and FCDO figures · reviewed 7 Sep 2026

They have not been returned, and at the moment they are not being returned. Britain and Mauritius signed a treaty on 22 May 2025 handing the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius while leasing back the Diego Garcia military base for 99 years. It has never been ratified. The law needed to bring it into force passed the Commons, went to the Lords, came back — and then stopped: on 13 Apr 2026 ministers said it could not finish, because "the position of the US President appears to have changed in recent weeks" and so "it has become impossible to agree at political level an update to the 1966 UK-US agreement". NOT RATIFIED NOTHING PAID
"There there will be no treaty payments at all to Mauritius" — Lord Coaker, Ministry of Defence, to the Lords, 14 Apr 2026. With no treaty, the base runs on the 1966 Anglo-American arrangement, which rolled over automatically and lasts until 30 December 2036.
Where the agreement actually got to
3 Oct 2024AnnouncedThe UK and Mauritius announce a political agreement. The US Secretary of State welcomes it.
22 May 2025SignedStarmer and Ramgoolam sign the treaty, hours after an injunction won at 02:25 that morning was discharged.
3 Jul 2025Parliament lets it passThe 21-sitting-day CRAG scrutiny period ends with no resolution against it; a Lords motion to block ratification had been defeated 185–205 on 30 June.
20 Oct 2025The Commons passes the BillThe Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill clears third reading.
5–12 Jan 2026The Lords amend itFive non-government amendments pass, two of them requiring a referendum of Chagossians before ratification.
20 Jan 2026The Commons overturns themMPs divide three times — 344–182, 347–185, 347–184 — and the two referendum amendments are set aside on financial privilege. The Bill goes back to the Lords the next day.
18 Feb 2026Washington reversesPresident Trump posts “DO NOT GIVE AWAY DIEGO GARCIA” — the day after his own State Department had said it supported the deal.
21 Mar 2026MissilesIran is reported to have fired ballistic missiles towards Diego Garcia. Neither reached the atoll; there were no casualties. It is raised in the Commons twice that week.
—The Lords never take it backConsideration of the Commons amendments is listed as “date to be announced” and is never scheduled. The Bill stops here.
13 Apr 2026The Bill fallsMinisters tell the Commons it cannot complete its passage: the US will not agree the updated 1966 exchange of notes that ratification requires.
13 May 2026Not in the King's SpeechNo Chagos bill in the new session.
1 Sep 2026Neither dead nor aliveThe Foreign Office will not say whether it remains policy to transfer the territory, whether a bill is coming, or whether the US has moved. The treaty is unratified and the base runs on the 1966 arrangement.
Green is a stage that completed; amber is where it stopped or went wrong. Parliament never voted the treaty down. The scrutiny period passed without objection, the Commons passed the Bill, and when the Lords amended it the Commons overturned those amendments. The stage that never happened is the Lords taking it back: it was listed as "date to be announced" and never scheduled. By long practice the UK does not ratify a treaty that needs an Act until the Act exists, so the treaty sits signed and inert. As at 30 Jul & 1 Sep 2026 the government will not say whether it is still policy: three written questions on the same day — including one asking exactly that — got the same sentence back, "We will continue to work with the US and Mauritius to find a way forward that is in the UK's best interests and protects our national security". In the Commons on 1 September a minister added the condition: "We have always been clear that the US Government must be content with the agreement before we proceed in ratifying the treaty". A Conservative private member's bill, the British Sovereignty Protection (Chagos Islands) Bill, is waiting for a second reading in the Lords.
One deal, three totals — why you saw both £3.4bn and £35bn
All three describe the same payments over the same 99 years, and none of them is wrong. The government's £3.4bn discounts future money at the Treasury's own Green Book rates (3.5% for the first 30 years, 3% to year 75, 2.5% after) on the principle that £1 in 2124 is not £1 today. The £34.7bn simply adds up the cash. The statistics regulator did not say the figure was wrong — he said the presentation was: "by describing the £3.4 billion figure as the net overall cost, it was not made clear to the public that the figure was calculated using a discounting method" (Sir Robert Chote, Chair of the UK Statistics Authority, 4 Jul 2025), while recording that the Office for Budget Responsibility considered the discount rate reasonable for valuing a lease. Full Fact, 6 Feb 2026; the £34.7bn obtained from the Government Actuary's Department, Aug 2025. Higher totals circulate on different inflation and discount assumptions. The three above are the ones whose method is set out in public, which is why they are the three drawn.
What the instalments would have been
Years 1–3 — base payment
£165m a year
Years 4–13 — base payment
£120m a year
Years 14–99 — base payment, indexed to the GDP deflator
£120m a year
Years 4–28 — development grants, not indexed
£45m a year
Plus £40m, a one-off capitalisation of a Chagossian trust fund, in year two. Averaged across the 99 years that is £101m a year, which the government put at less than 0.2% of the defence budget — and, by our own division across Britain's 40.8 million income tax payers (HMRC's projection for 2026-27; who they are), about £2.48 a year each. The bill would fall inside existing budgets: "Funding for the treaty will be provided within the existing spending review settlements for the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Ministry of Defence" (Uma Kumaran, Foreign Office, to the Commons, 1 Sep 2026); how it splits between the two has not been published. Treaty Article 11, as summarised by the House of Commons Library, 2025. None of it has been paid, and none of it can be until the legislation exists.
The official reason: the base was said to be losing its legal footing. On 25 Feb 2019 the International Court of Justice held, by 13–1, that "the process of decolonization of Mauritius was not lawfully completed" when Mauritius became independent in 1968, and that "the United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible". Three months later the UN General Assembly voted 116–6 (56 abstentions) to demand Britain "withdraw its colonial administration … within a period of no more than six months". Then, on 28 Jan 2021, a chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea — deciding a case between Mauritius and the Maldives, to which Britain was not a party — held that the International Court's findings on decolonisation had legal effect for the status of the archipelago, and that Britain's continued claim to sovereignty ran contrary to them. That was the turn that mattered to ministers: an advisory opinion binds nobody, but a judgment in a contested case does — and this chamber decided one without the UK in the room. Beyond the courts, the Universal Postal Union stopped registering and forwarding BIOT stamps in 2021, there were challenges at the International Telecommunication Union over the radio spectrum the base runs on, and sovereignty challenges at the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. The then Defence Secretary named the tribunal as the danger — "The most proximate, and the most potentially serious, is the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea" — and told the Commons: "As the world becomes more dangerous, Diego Garcia becomes more important" (the then Defence Secretary, John Healey, to the Commons, 22 May 2025).
The counter-case is that none of it bound Britain. Policy Exchange, February 2025: "these advisory judgments are just that", and on the spectrum argument, the ITU has "no international enforcement mechanism. It is more a gentleman's agreement" — the words of an ITU spokesman, quoted in the same paper (Policy Exchange, Feb 2025, with Richard Ekins KC (Hon) among the authors). Britain has, since 1998, formally excluded disputes concerning military activities from the compulsory jurisdiction of Law of the Sea tribunals, under Article 298 of the Convention — which critics say was a defence the government never had to give up. It is a shield to be raised, not a bar: the tribunal, not Britain, decides whether a dispute really is about military activities. And it does nothing about the International Court, the General Assembly or the UN agencies, which is where most of the pressure actually was. Against all of that, Sir Christopher Greenwood, former judge of the International Court of Justice, to a Lords committee, Jun 2025 said the 2019 opinion "gives the clearest possible steer that no international court is likely to find in Britain's favour". Every one of these is on the record and the tile does not choose between them.
The case for the deal
  • It ends the legal risk to a base Britain actually uses. The government's position is that a binding ruling against the UK was foreseeable and unwinnable, and that a hostile provisional-measures order could have come "within weeks". The treaty would have secured Diego Garcia for 99 years with an option on 40 more.
  • It buys control of the neighbourhood. A 24-nautical-mile buffer in which nothing could be built without British consent, and the outer islands could not be used by other powers' security forces, and any development there would trigger a joint security review — the specific answer to the worry about a Chinese foothold.
  • The price is small against what it protects. less than 0.2% of the defence budget, on the government's own figure, and payable out of budgets that already exist.
  • It settles a wrong the courts have now found twice. The International Court in 2019, and on 31 Mar 2026 the Supreme Court of the British Indian Ocean Territory itself, which quashed section 9 of the 2004 constitution order — the provision barring Chagossians from the islands — as unlawful, and quashed the removal notices.
  • Some Chagossians wanted it. Chagossian groups do not agree: the Chagos Refugees Group in Mauritius called the signing “a historic day for us”; Chagossian Voices opposed the treaty, wanting the right of return to include Diego Garcia itself
The case against it
  • Paying to give something away. The UK currently pays no lease at all. The counterfactual to £3.4bn is not a bigger bill — it is nothing, at least until 30 December 2036.
  • An advisory opinion is advice. The 2019 opinion binds nobody, Britain was not a party to the 2021 tribunal case, and since 1998 it has formally excluded military-activity disputes from compulsory jurisdiction. Critics argue no court had actually ordered anything.
  • The Chagossians were not at the table. Four UN human rights experts said in June 2025 that the agreement did not protect Chagossians' rights, including their right to return to Diego Garcia, and that Chagossians had not meaningfully taken part in making it. A Lords committee found 2,173 of 3,128 of those who answered a Lords committee survey said they lacked confidence in the Mauritian authorities to run the £40m trust fund.
  • The resettlement promise is thin. Mauritius could resettle Chagossians on every island except Diego Garcia — the one island anyone was removed from stays out — and the Lords International Agreements Committee, HL Paper 146, 25 Jun 2025 found the agreement "does not provide a clear route to resettlement".
  • Precedent. If a court's view of decolonisation can move sovereignty here, the argument runs, the same reasoning is available to Argentina and to Spain. Ministers say the Falklands and Gibraltar are different because those populations have voted; the Chagos islands have no settled population to hold a vote.
The people it is actually about. Britain bought the archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 for £3m, paid to Mauritius on the detachment of the archipelago, three years before its independence, and then emptied it: 1968–1973, between 1,400 and 1,700 people were removed to Mauritius and the Seychelles (the territory's own range; the House of Commons Library says "most of the 2,000 Islanders"), and a 1971 immigration ordinance made it unlawful to enter or remain in the territory without a permit. Compensation was £650,000 to the Mauritian government in the early 1970s and £4m plus land in 1982, in exchange for signed renunciations that later cost them their case at the European Court of Human Rights. They won in the High Court in 2000 and lost in the House of Lords in 2008, 3–2. In 16 Nov 2016 the government refused resettlement on "feasibility, defence and security interests, and cost to the British taxpayer", offering instead £40 million over ten years to support Chagossians where they now live — which had spent "just £1.6 million by the time this Government came into power" (Seema Malhotra, to the Commons, 28 Jan 2026, of spending up to July 2024).
About 3,500 Chagossians live in Crawley, which the council says is two-thirds of those living in this country (Crawley Borough Council, 2024); no current worldwide total is published. And it is not history. Four Chagossian men landed by yacht on Île du Coin, in the Peros Banhos atoll, intending to stay. Removal notices were served two days later. On 31 Mar 2026, the Supreme Court of the British Indian Ocean Territory quashed section 9 of the 2004 constitution order — the provision barring Chagossians from the islands — as unlawful, and quashed the removal notices. That order has been stayed pending an appeal, so section 9 remains in force and the territory's administration says it will entertain no application to enter for settlement until the appeal is decided. (BIOT Administration permit notice, 31 Mar 2026, updated 24 Apr 2026.)
What is actually on the island. Diego Garcia is 44 km² of the territory's 50 km² of land — 58 islands scattered through an exclusive economic zone of 640,000 km² in the middle of the Indian Ocean (the territory's own figures; other reference works give a larger land area and a smaller Diego Garcia). It has a 3,659-metre runway, is one of the six US Space Force stations that monitor GPS — sixteen in all, counting ten later ones, hosts a deep-space surveillance site tracking satellites, and a squadron of American prepositioning ships lies at anchor in the lagoon. B-52s bombed Iraq from it in 1991, and it flew the opening bombing of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003. In March 2025 satellite imagery showed multiple B-2 stealth bombers on the apron, with F-15s sent to defend them. There are ordinarily around 2000 people on it (BIOT Administration, undated) — American and British service personnel, territory officials and contractors. There is no settled civilian population, and that is the point of the argument in both directions.
It is also, now, a target. On 21 Mar 2026 Iran is reported to have fired ballistic missiles towards the island. Neither reached the atoll and there were no casualties. "a US destroyer intercepted at least one of the missiles that Iran fired at our sovereign territory on Diego Garcia" (Mark Francois, to the Commons, 24 Mar 2026); from the government benches, "neither Iranian missile got anywhere close to Diego Garcia" (Paul Waugh, to the Commons, 23 Mar 2026). No UK minister confirmed the attack in their own words, and Iran denied it. Around the islands, since 2010, is a no-take marine protected area, the largest in the world when it was declared of 640,000 km². A tribunal found unanimously in 2015 that in declaring it Britain had breached its obligations under the Law of the Sea Convention, by failing to have due regard to Mauritius's rights and to consult properly. It made no finding of improper purpose and did not order the reserve's removal. Britain's trade with Mauritius itself is £2bn a year — its 75th largest trading partner, 0.1% of UK trade (four quarters to end Q1 2026, Department for Business & Trade factsheet, 31 Jul 2026). This was never an economic transaction.
iNothing has left your pocket for this. Had it gone through, the average payment works out at about £2.48 a year for every income tax payer in Britain — our division of the government's own £101m average — too small to be the real argument either way. The real argument is whether a court's opinion should move sovereignty, and whether a base Britain shares with America is worth a lease on land it currently holds for nothing. What has changed since the headlines is that it stopped: no ratification, no payment, no handover, no bill before Parliament — and, since July, a government that will not say either way. The base's existing legal basis runs to 30 December 2036, so this returns well before then whatever happens next.

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🌴 How to read the Chagos figures

So have we given the islands away or not?
No. A treaty was signed on 22 May 2025, and signing is not the end of the process — a treaty that needs a change in British law does not take effect until Parliament passes that law. The Bill got through the Commons, the Lords amended it in January 2026, and the Commons overturned those amendments on 20 January, dividing three times. Then it needed to go back to the Lords one last time, and that stage was listed as "date to be announced" and never scheduled. On 13 April 2026 ministers said the Bill could not finish, because the United States would not agree the updated 1966 exchange of notes that ratification depends on. It was not in the King's Speech in May 2026. No sovereignty has moved, no money has changed hands, and the base still operates under the arrangements Britain and America made in 1966, which run to 30 December 2036.
Is it dead, then?
The government will not say. On 30 July 2026 three separate written questions — including one asking simply whether it remains policy to transfer the territory — all got the same sentence back: that ministers "will continue to work with the US and Mauritius to find a way forward". On 1 September 2026 the Commons was told the United States "must be content with the agreement before we proceed in ratifying the treaty". So: signed, unratified, unfunded, no bill before Parliament, and not withdrawn. Treat this section of the tile as the part most likely to be out of date.
Why the same deal cost £3.4 billion and £35 billion
Because those are two ways of adding up the same instalments, and both were honest. The £3.4bn is a net present value: future payments discounted back to today's money at the Treasury's standard Green Book rates, on the reasoning that a pound payable in 2124 is not a pound now. The £34.7bn is what the cheques would total in cash. Between them, about £10bn is the figure if you adjust for inflation but do not discount. The head of the UK Statistics Authority did not say the government's number was wrong; he said it should not have been called "the net overall cost" without saying it had been discounted, and he noted the Office for Budget Responsibility thought the discount rate reasonable for valuing a lease. Higher totals have been quoted using different inflation and discount assumptions; the tile draws the three whose method is published, because a total you cannot check the workings of is not a fact.
An advisory opinion is not a court order — so why did it matter?
It is the heart of the disagreement. The International Court of Justice's 2019 opinion was advisory: it bound nobody, and critics say the government treated advice as a verdict. The government's answer is that the 2021 tribunal case showed where advice leads. There, a Law of the Sea chamber deciding a boundary between Mauritius and the Maldives — a case Britain was not party to — treated the International Court's findings as settling the legal status of the archipelago, and did it without Britain in the room. Ministers concluded a binding ruling was a matter of time, and that meanwhile the base's ability to hold radio spectrum, postal codes and fishing rights was being picked at through UN agencies. The strongest reply is that since 1998 Britain has formally excluded disputes about military activities from the compulsory jurisdiction of those tribunals — though that is a shield the tribunal itself decides whether to accept, and it does nothing about the International Court or the General Assembly. Whether all this was prudence or surrender is exactly what the argument is about, and the tile gives both sides their own words.
What "British Indian Ocean Territory" is
It is one of the fourteen British Overseas Territories — British sovereign land that is not part of the United Kingdom. Unlike the Falklands or Gibraltar it has no settled civilian population, because the people who lived there were removed between 1968 and 1973. That absence works both ways in the argument: the government says there is no population whose self-determination could be at stake, so the Falklands and Gibraltar are not a precedent; Chagossians say the absence is precisely the wrong being argued over, and that they were never asked. In February 2026 four Chagossian men landed on Île du Coin and refused to leave, and in March a court there struck down the rule that had kept them out — an order now suspended while the government appeals.
Why the tile does not say what "the Chagossians want"
Because they do not agree, and pretending otherwise would be the site putting words in people's mouths. The Chagos Refugees Group in Mauritius welcomed the signing; Chagossian Voices opposed it and wants a right of return that includes Diego Garcia itself, which no version of the deal offered. Both are quoted. What is not in dispute is that no Chagossian organisation was a party to the negotiation, that UN human rights experts said so publicly in June 2025, and that most of those who answered a Lords committee survey lacked confidence in the proposed trust fund.
What we left out on purpose, and what we took out
Whether the deal was right. That is a judgement about sovereignty, international law and an ally's goodwill, and it is not ours to make on your behalf. We also took several things out after a second check: two higher cost totals whose workings we could not obtain, a claim about how many supply ships sit in the lagoon, a comparison with what France pays for a base elsewhere, and a count of Gulf war bombing missions — all of them plausible, none of them traceable to a source we could open. Where a figure is missing from this tile it is usually because of that, and not because it was inconvenient.

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